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THE INFLUENCE OF CULTURAL ACTIVITY TYPES ON SELLER-BUYER 
NEGOTIATIONS – A GAME THEORETIC FRAMEWORK FOR INTERNATIONAL 
NEGOTIATIONS 
 
 
Abstract 
 
This article uses an intercultural bargaining framework for sellers and buyers to analyze co-
operation and conflict in international negotiations. On the basis of game theoretical 
reasoning, culturally programmed bargaining behavior is transformed into a buyer-seller 
interaction of importer-exporter negotiations. The cultural differences of the players can be 
seen in the initial offer, the strategic approach, the valuation of time, the frequency of 
rejection and the objectives of the negotiation. In order to provide prescriptions for cross-
cultural bargaining, the clash of cultures is dealt with in nine scenarios on an abstract level to 
show potential conflicts and cooperation between the players.  
 
 
Key words: International negotiations, cultural implications, game theoretic reasoning, 
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Introduction 
 
Over the past decades cross-border transactions and globalization have led to a better 
knowledge of customs and values of other cultures. Communication as the crucial means in 
negotiations determines the outcome of each endeavor in either bridging or deepening the gap 
between managers of different business and national cultures. Misunderstandings, originating 
from differences in cultural backgrounds, show that there are still heterogeneous aspects in 
international business negotiations to be considered. An anecdotal understanding of the 
pitfalls is not enough to overcome difficulties. Weiss (1996), in his survey on international 
business negotiations, came to the conclusion that there is, surprisingly, less literature than 
expected, though the origins of research in this field go back at least 25 years. Nevertheless, 
Faure and Shakun (1999) emphasized that visible effects have been made to bridge the gap 
between theory and practice. The tendency towards conclusions of a more prescriptive nature 
has been achieved with the help of experiments, simulations and case studies. On the basis of 
cultural negotiation patterns, a theoretical framework for cross-cultural bargaining should 
therefore provide generalizable or robust insights about co-operation and conflict. Thus, it is 
necessary to understand culture and its implications as a starting point for conceptualizing an 
intercultural negotiation. This paper proposes a theoretical framework for international 
negotiations by applying a game theoretic perspective to exporter and importer scenarios. 
 
Hofstede (1983) defines ‘culture’ as collective mental programming. Through experiences 
people become mentally programmed to interpret new experiences. Traditions and common 
ways of thinking are part of an invisible set of a cognitive program rooted in the common 
culture but may vary for different cultures. If cultural differences occurred because of the 
mental programming and learned behavior, then the bargaining process can belong to one of 
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the basic patterns people were brought up. Faure and Shakun (1999) stated that culture has a 
direct impact on negotiation through the actors involved and manifests itself at the levels of 
cognition, beliefs and behaviors. Similarly, D’Andrade (1987) stated that a cultural model is a 
cognitive schema that is inter-subjectively shared by a social group. Such models consist of a 
small number of conceptual objects and their relations to each other. The cognitive schema of 
a simple bargaining situation involves an initial price, a series of converging bids and counter 
offers, and possibly a final agreement. Salacuse (1999, p. 218) emphasized that ‘while the 
essence of culture may reside in the mind, it must be pointed out that persons gain their 
understanding of their and others’ cultures primarily, if not exclusively, from observing the 
behavior and institutions of a particular group. Salacuse (1999, p. 217) stated, furthermore, 
that ‘culture profoundly influences how people think, communicate and behave, and it also 
affects the kinds of deals they make and the way they make them’. Thus, the importance of 
cultures and in particular different bargaining behavior has to be considered in the failure and 
success of international business negotiations.  
 
Weiss (1996) following Graham (1985) stated that Japanese made more extreme initial offers 
than Americans (Americans made ‘fair’ offers), used the word ‘no’ less frequently, were 
silent longer, and used aggressive tactics only later in negotiations and in the buyer not seller 
role. The Brazilian bargaining behavior (Graham 1983, 1984, 1985) was even more extreme 
than the Japanese with respect to the initial offer. Brazilians showed fewer promises and 
commitments, more commands and longer interactions than Americans did. Brazilians 
interrupted each other more and uttered an extraordinary amount of ‘no’s’. Furthermore, 
Graham and Mintu-Wimsat (1997, p. 499) tested in a simulation the determinants of 
negotiation outcomes based on Americans, Brazilians, Japanese and additionally Spaniards. 
The authors found that a problem-solving approach results in a higher negotiation outcome 
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for Americans when their partners reciprocate, the role (buyer or seller) is the key 
determinant of profits for Japanese negotiations and interpersonal attractiveness lead to 
higher partner satisfaction for Brazilians. These studies using various methods showed clearly 
that different culturally determined patterns have an impact on the outcome of a negotiation. 
Nevertheless, it is necessary to develop a framework for cross-cultural bargaining to predict 
the potential in an intercultural negotiation scenario. 
 
Pruitt and Carnevale (1993) developed a useful overview of the traditions in the study of 
negotiations: the first consists of books providing advice, the second consists of mathematical 
models of rational behavior by economists and game theorists and the third is the behavioral 
tradition which develops and tests predictive theory about the impact of environmental 
conditions on negotiator behavior and the impact of these conditions and behaviors on 
outcomes. 
 
This paper develops a framework for dealing and negotiating with and within different 
cultural groups based on a game theoretical bargaining model. Such an approach offers an 
analytical basis for further research. In the last twenty years game theory has seen a rapid 
expansion to the fields of economics (microeconomics – the largest single area of 
application), social psychology (two-person bargaining, social dilemmas, coalition 
formation), evolutionary biology (application to biological contexts, strategic aspects of 
evolution), political sciences (voting systems, power, international relations), accounting, 
marketing, law and computer science (Rapoport, A and Zwick, R.; 2000). An analogous 
study of Hausken (1987) integrated game-theoretic and behavioral negotiation theory, where 
behavioral negotiation theory has a foundation in psychology, organization theory, sociology 
and related fields. This paper can be seen in a similar way to combine ‘cultural’ negotiation 
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theory with game-theoretic negotiation theory. The translation of cultural issues into 
bargaining rules is viewed as an important requirement for modeling. The paper specifies the 
categories of culture first and then focuses on the interdisciplinary theoretical underpinning. 
Game theoretical reasoning is used to provide insights into the bargaining of different cultural 
programs. The application of the game theoretic perspective to exporter-importer negotiations 
based on their cultural program has the following structure: the order of the play, the time 
horizon, the payoffs, conflict and co-operation. The scenarios are developed to abstract 
problems between an exporter and an importer of different cultural backgrounds.  
 
International Bargaining and the Importance of Culture 
 
Several frameworks in international business have been developed over time to show the 
impact of different cultural variables on the dynamics of international business negotiations 
(Sawyer and Guetzkow 1965; Fayerweather and Kapoor 1976; Graham 1987; Moran and 
Stripp 1991; Ghauri, 2003). Early guidelines to international business negotiations considered 
cultural diversity with respect to antecedent goals, concurrent process and consequent 
outcome as well as background factors and conditions. Recent discussions focusing on 
negotiations and culture (D’Amico and Rubinstein 1999; Kopelman and Olekalns 1999) 
emphasize that language, cognition, rapport, trust, power and outcome play an important role 
in international negotiations. Though, such frameworks and discussions are important for the 
development of intercultural communication and negotiations, there is no concept of how to 
find the potential conflicts and co-operative elements.  
 
In terms of cultural similarities and differences, Pruitt and Carnevale (1993) suggest that 
future research should consider characteristics in negotiation style found in various cultures, 
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since this field of study is still in its infancy. The authors pointed out that one perspective of 
cultural differences in negotiations stems from the theory of collectivism and individualism. 
 
In terms of cultural differences, Hofstede (1985, p. 347) stated that among the components of 
national culture are the prevalent value systems those parents within a culture transfer to their 
children. This means that cultural values are shaped during one’s upbringing through parents 
and institutions. In a global model of four dimensions of culture, the national value systems 
are clustered and presented in four value dimensions: power distance, uncertainty avoidance, 
individualism and masculinity. Hofstede’s study is used in international business theory to 
explain organizational behavior based on cultural differences. Kopelman and Olekalns (1999, 
p. 375) pointed out that individualist and collectivist cultures may differ with respect to 
relational and identity goals that shape their negotiation strategy. Steensma et al. (2000) 
found that entrepreneurs from collective, feminine and uncertainty-avoiding cultures had a 
greater appreciation for co-operative strategies than entrepreneurs from individualistic, 
masculine and uncertainty-tolerant societies who might need governmental programs and 
incentives to make co-operative strategies much more attractive.  
 
The consequences of Hofstede’s cultural dimensions for international negotiations (Lewicki, 
et al, 1999) were discussed in the following way. Power distance has an impact of the length 
of negotiations, because negotiators from comparatively high power distance cultures may 
need to seek approval from their supervisors. Individualism/collectivism indicators show the 
importance of relationship and the emphasis of building up trust, which will influence the 
time perspective of negotiators. The masculinity/femininity dimension leads to the focus on 
competitiveness and compromise in international negotiations. Finally, the index of 
uncertainty avoidance can be linked to the rules of negotiations and the attitude towards risks 
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in international negotiations. Although some studies (Hofstede, 1985; Schwartz, 1994) 
showed characteristics in dealing with other cultures by focusing on values, the clash of 
culture and the potential to avoid certain deadlock scenarios in negotiations could not be 
delivered. Thus, it is important to focus on the actual decision-making and bargaining 
process.  
 
Lewis (1999) developed a prescriptive framework for grouping national and regional cultures 
of the world based on his experience as a chairman of a company with offices in more than 
30 countries. The focus of this framework is on activity, time perspectives, process-
orientation and confrontational negotiation styles. Three main groups were distinguished: 
task-oriented, highly organized planners (linear-active culture); people-oriented, loquacious 
‘inter-relators’ (multi-active culture); introvert, respect-oriented listeners (reactive culture). 
The different national and regional cultures can be categorized into the three types linear-
active, multi-active and reactive cluster in order to point out the features on an abstract level. 
Though there are also mixtures of the cultural types, it can be stated that, in general, the 
negotiation behavior follows the classification. Regional differences can be found within 
Europe, Asia, Africa and Latin America.  
 
********** 
Insert TABLE 1: Characteristics of the Linear-active, Multi-active and Reactive Cultures 
*********** 
 
Some cultures have features of all the different types, but with different weights. For 
instance, exporters from the North of Italy could have a high percentage of linear-active 
features compared to South Italians. Bargaining with an exporter from Milan could create a 
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different time horizon compared to an exporter from Naples. Thus, the latter would fit more 
in the category of multi-active cultures, whereas the first-mentioned would be a more even 
mixture of both types.  
 
*********** 
Insert Figure 1: Cultural Profiles of Linear-active, Multi-active and Reactive Cultures 
*********** 
 
The triangle shows the national cultures being combinations of linear-active, multi-active and 
reactive features. It is a matter of putting weights to these combinations to find out personal 
cultural profiles. Though a combination of all three types can occur in various cultures, it is 
important to focus on one type negotiating with another type for the sake of abstraction and 
analytical grounding. This paper examines the clashes of pure types (US-Americans, 
Japanese and Brazilians) to emphasize the differences between the bargaining behaviors. 
 
Empirical Evidence for the Classification of Cultural Types 
 
To develop a framework for cross-cultural negotiations, it is important to emphasize on the 
empirical evidence of differences and similarities between cultures. An interesting feature of 
empirical studies in international negotiations is the strong focus on US and Japanese 
negotiations. Other cultures such as Brazilians, Spanish and Israeli are included to show a 
different perspective and to highlight the differences/antipodes of US and Japanese 
bargaining. Thus in terms of Lewis’ framework we can already distinguish between the 
linear-active, and reactive cultures as well as the multi-active types. Adair et al. (1998) 
investigated that cultural compatibility may stimulate high joint gains in inter-cultural 
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negotiations. The culture data revealed that US, Israeli and Japanese cultures support the 
notion of culture continuum posited in culture theory and research. US and Israeli are most 
similar, Israeli and Japanese are somewhat similar and different, and the US and Japanese are 
most different. Thus, Israeli fell in between the US and Japanese on mean values for 
individualism and hierarchy as well as self-interest negotiation schema. Dialdin et. al (1999) 
focus on the distributive aspect of negotiation and concentrate on differences in individual 
outcomes in the context of cross-cultural negotiations. The results of this study suggest that a 
negotiator’s ability to benefit individually in a negotiation may vary by culture. Furthermore, 
the findings show that specific situational variables such as the negotiator’s role as buyer or 
seller and dyad composition relate to culture and to different levels of individual gains. The 
authors found that Israeli and US participants achieved higher individual gains as buyers than 
as sellers; that the German, Japanese and Hong Kong-participants achieved higher individual 
gains as sellers than as buyers. Since the study was based only on one dimension of culture 
(individualism) and two situational variables (role and dyad composition), process data needs 
to be collected to find out what types of scripts of information exchange lead to higher 
individual outcomes.  
 
Adair and Brett (2001) empirically tested that high context cultures (Hall, 1976) are skilled in 
both indirect and direct forms of communication. Thus, the authors found that negotiators 
from high context cultures used more complementary and structural sequences. The results 
show that the difference between high and low context communication is not just in the 
frequency of what is said or what is reciprocated, but in the scope and flexibility of how 
negotiators communicate. Furthermore, negotiators from high context cultures could 
supplement information that may not have been sufficiently conveyed through reciprocal 
offers, by complementing priority information and offers. Likewise, negotiators from high 
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context cultures could convey the strength of their rejection of the offer, by structuring offers 
with rational influence. Adair (2002) found that cross-cultural negotiators need to focus not 
only on a personal connection with the other party, but also on a more behavioral, skill-based 
connection. Thus, cross-cultural negotiators who are able to use a wide range of information 
sharing behaviors will have more success in establishing regular patterns of reciprocal 
information exchange. This study suggests that because cross-cultural negotiators share few 
interpersonal and behavioral similarities, they are quite aware of interaction patterns that 
represent a common approach. Therefore, the sequenced patterns of reciprocal explicit 
information exchange can contribute to motivation and information to generate joint gains 
and cooperation to generate trust. The results show that reciprocal information was negatively 
related to joint gains and was not related to trust for any of the samples and the findings have 
implications for the role of reciprocal offers and counter-offers and information exchange. 
Adair (2001) found evidence that high context Japanese negotiators use offers to exchange 
information and generate joint gains. Offers have been shown to act as positional or 
distributive strategies as well as information generating or integrative strategies. In order to 
generate joint gains, offers over time must contain enough information for negotiators to 
identify preferences and priorities. If negotiators exchange primarily single-issue offers, it 
may be difficult even for high context negotiators to extract information on priorities. As 
Adair (2002) pointed out that content, timing, and strategic intent of offers are an interesting 
area of future research, it is an important perspective to develop a framework for empirical 
analysis in order to capture these issues. Overall, it is necessary to stress that time-based 
differences in international negotiations is an important topic (Adair and Brett, 2004, 2005; 
Adair, Weingart and Brett, 2007). Secondly, from a cultural psychology perspective the 
works of Adair and Brett (2004, 2007 and together with Weingart, 2005) are particularly 
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relevant as they confirm that time, first offers, sequence of offers and rejection and 
acceptance are a cultural program for US-American and Japanese negotiators. 
 
Roth et al (1981) found experimental results for differences between bargaining behavior in 
different countries from looking at proposed prices and acceptances and rejections.  A clear 
pattern showed that higher offers are accepted more frequently than lower offers. In the 
experiments the buyer had to offer and therefore the differences between cultures can be seen 
in the offer around the fifty-fifty proposal (in this case 500). The difference among the 
subject pools is in something like their aggressiveness or toughness. Buyers with more 
aggressive subject pools would be more inclined to take advantage of their first-mover 
position to try to obtain more for themselves than might be fair. Therefore the offers of USA 
and Yugoslavian buyers were around 500 and Israeli and Japanese at 400 (Japanese has a 
second mode of 450). The overall disagreement rates which is the percentage of all offers that 
are rejected without conditioning on the offer were for the US 28%, for Yugoslavia 29%, for 
Japan 22% and for Israel 28%. In terms of initial prices or proposals we can therefore see the 
fair price approach by linear-active cultures (USA and Yugoslavia) and the multi-active 
(Israel) and reactive (Japan) approach of the other two cultures.  
 
In terms of cultural bargaining between the three significant cultures USA, Brazil and Japan, 
the empirical evidence of these behavioral patterns is developed in the following way. 
Graham’s (1985) study on US-American, Brazilian and Japanese business negotiation 
behavior empirically tests their bargaining strategies. The author found that Brazilian 
bargainers asked for much more initially and initial concessions also appear to be higher for 
the Brazilian bargainers than for Americans and Japanese. Additionally, Brazilians used the 
word ‘no’ much more frequently than either American or Japanese bargainers. The use of 
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‘no’ was not an answer to a question, even so it preceded a statement of disagreement. With 
regards to silent periods, it occurred more frequently in the Japanese interactions (5.5/30 
minutes) than either the American (3.5/30 minutes) or Brazilian (none were discovered). This 
study furthermore found that culture-specific process variables such as first offer and initial 
concessions differ between these countries. Japanese asked for consistently higher profit 
solutions when making initial offers. Americans were more apt to offer a ‘fair’ price, one that 
was closer to the eventual solution. Americans also tended to make larger initial concessions. 
The Brazilian businessmen made fewer commitments and more commands. First offers were 
more ‘greedy’ than either the Japanese or the American offers. The Brazilian bargainers 
disagreed with bargaining partners. In a further study, Graham and Mintu-Wimsat (1992) 
tested four cultures American, Brazilian, Japanese and Spanish in terms of culture’s influence 
on negotiations. In this study, substantive findings showed that when American negotiators 
use a problem-solving approach, it will be reciprocated by their partners, which will lead to 
higher negotiator profits. Furthermore, American buyers achieve higher profits than 
American sellers. Japanese and Brazilian negotiators regard interpersonal attractiveness in 
terms of relationship building as a key role in negotiations. For Spaniards, the relationship 
was not quite so important. Furthermore, for the Japanese negotiators role (buyer-seller) was 
the most striking determinate of negotiator’s profits, since buyers achieved much higher 
profits than sellers. Bartos (1978) pointed out that Americans make their main concessions 
early.  
 
Salacuse (1999) investigated culture and negotiating styles and used ten factors in deal 
making which reach from negotiating goals to time sensitivity. The results of the survey 
showed that 34% of the Brazilian respondents claimed that their primary goal in a negotiation 
was a relationship instead of a contract compared to 46% of the Americans and 45% of the 
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Japanese. For Americans signing a contract is closing a deal whereas for Japanese it might be 
opening a relationship. This might explain why Asians tend to give more time and effort to 
prenegotiation, while Americans want to rush through. The time sensitivity results show that 
85% of the Americans, 91% of the Japanese and 100% of Brazilians have a high sensitivity 
for time. Usunier (2003) analyzed and conceptualized the role of time in international 
business negotiations which is consistent with this paper’s assumption that there is a major 
contrast between Western temporal models (linear, economic time) and Eastern time patterns 
(cyclical-integrated time). Compared to Usunier’s (2003) Western versus Eastern time 
approach, this paper however combines these time perceptions with a third the Latin (multi-
active, emotional) time approach to capture an important otherwise neglected concept of 
time. Thus, it is now possible to design the framework with regards to the three categories of 
cultures.    
 
Having shown the cultural characteristics of US and Japanese as well as Brazilian and 
Spanish behavior in negotiations, it is important to aggregate the empirical results. These 
three cultural types are consistent with linear-active, multi-active and reactive features and 
are empirically embedded examples of the activity-based categorization. We can therefore 
show the features and negotiations styles according to the culturally programmed specifics. 
These three culturally programmed bargaining patterns can be related to game theoretical 
factors of negotiation styles.  
************ 
Insert TABLE 2: Empirical Characteristics of Activity-Based Cultural Types 
************ 
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Theoretical Underpinning  
 
For analyzing an international business negotiation setting, game theoretical reasoning can be 
used due to its possibility to put oneself into the shoes of the other player and to anticipate co-
operation and conflict. Thus, the underlying framework determines the games being played 
by various cultures and develops an abstract model of inter-cultural negotiations.  
 
Based on the classical axiomatic (Nash 1950,1951,1953; Kalai-Smorodinsky, 1975) and 
strategic (Rubinstein 1982, 1985) bargaining models, the strategic behavior of buyers and 
sellers can be analyzed. More complicated games are sequential bargaining games like offer-
counter-offer, ‘buyer offers’, ‘seller offers’ and alternating offers. Since these bargaining 
games take more than one period of negotiations into account, the stages of the game pertain 
to the time structure and the order of the play.  
 
The longer a negotiation process takes, the higher the costs become. Thus, apart from the 
players’ actions, the costs of bargaining indicate the structure of the game. The costs of 
bargaining can be time dependent or time independent. Time plays a crucial role in 
bargaining and can be measured as a discount factor related to the costs of bargaining - either 
proportional to the remaining value of the price or as fixed bargaining costs (e.g. delay costs 
are equal, delay hurts the exporter or importer more). It matters whether the duration of a 
negotiation takes place in one day or over the period of two years, since it induces transaction 
costs and opportunity costs.  
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Another important property of an intercultural bargaining game is the incomplete information 
resulting from uncertainties about the other player. Uncertainties about time preferences, 
utility functions, valuations of the product, strategy profile and cultural background can occur 
in all kinds of bargaining situations. McMillan (1992) stated that information, in general, is a 
source of bargaining strength. One player might use his information advantage and the other 
can take defensive measures to mitigate the informational disadvantage. The Harsanyi 
doctrine (1967,68) is the basis of games under incomplete information. His type theory was 
developed under the general assumption that each player appears to his opponent as an 
unknown type drawn from a known probability distribution of possible types. A bargaining 
game with incomplete information, therefore, can be transformed to a game of imperfect 
information by means of the moves of nature (dummy player). This requires a precise 
description of all possible combinations of types of players as well as the specification of 
their subjective probabilities (Harsanyi, 1967/68).  
 
Cross (1978) stated that strategy choices are affected by uncertainty. Large amounts of 
uncertainty may encourage very large initial payoff demands as a kind of insurance against 
making an unnecessarily generous offer. The bargaining strategy choice is furthermore based 
on the maximization of utility which is not only dependent on the settlement payoff, since it 
also reflects the costs of time delay before a settlement is reached and the losses occurring 
due to the use of force or coercion.   
 
Bartos (1978) stated that each negotiator is interested to make his opening bid as close to 
having zero payoff for his opponent. Thus, each negotiator must search for an opening bid 
that will be accepted by the opponent only with the greatest reluctance. Therefore, having an 
opening bid accepted reluctantly, each negotiator has an idea what agreement to expect. 
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Opening bids determine what is viewed as a fair agreement and are therefore of crucial 
importance. Apart from the opening bid, the decision of how large the first concession should 
be is dependent on psychological and social factors as well as the time horizon. The first 
concession will be large in case the negotiator is a trusting person. If the negotiator knows 
that the opponent’s reputation is tough, then the concession will be very small. The first 
concession will be large in case the negotiator is under pressure to reach an agreement.  
 
Since Pruitt and Carnevale (1993) described a strategy a plan of action and distinguished five 
broad strategies in negotiations, we can distinguish between concession making (reducing 
one’s goals, demands and offers), contending (trying to persuade the other party to concede 
or to resist similar efforts by the other party), problem solving (trying to locate and adopt 
options that satisfy both parties’ goals), inaction (doing nothing or as little as possible) and 
withdrawal (dropping of the negotiation). Pruitt (1981) considers working relationships as 
involving three related norms for dealing with mixed-motive settings: a norm of problem 
solving, a norm of mutual responsiveness and a norm of truth in signaling.  
 
Muthoo (1999) suggests that in real-life bargaining situations the procedures are ambiguous 
and not well-specified. With regards to offers, the author points out that the player who 
makes the offer has the greater bargaining power. In real life, bargaining situations the 
procedure allows only one of the two players to make offers. Muthoo furthermore states that 
in alternating-offers the time interval between two consecutive offers is 0  and it is 
important to distinguish between the player’s time intervals. Incomplete information is 
considered as the cause for agreements to be delayed. Gul and Sonnenschein (1988) identify 
delay to agreement with a screening process, where agents with lower valuations distinguish 
themselves by waiting longer to settle. Thus, we can point out that each player has a different 
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time interval to make offers. The equilibrium partition is dependent on the ratio of these 
different time intervals. Muthoo found that a small difference between i  and j , where the 
index represent the two players i and j, has a significant impact on the subgame perfect 
equilibrium partition for instance. Therefore, the author postulates that the bargaining 
outcome depends critically upon the relative magnitude of the players’ cost of haggling.   
 
Raiffa (1982, p.54) emphasized on asymmetries in negotiations such as differences in initial 
endowment or wealth, differences in time-related costs, differences in perceived 
determination or aggressiveness, differences in marginal valuations, differences in needs and 
differences in the number of people comprising each side. Time plays an important role and 
the bargainer who is willing to wait longer, to probe more patiently, to appear less eager for 
settlement will be more successful (Raiffa, 1982, p. 78). It was pointed out that when people 
haggle in a bazaarlike fashion over one-time issues as the price of a used car, each player may 
have a short-time perspective that might lead to exaggerate the case. Whereas, in other cases, 
bargainers will have frequent negotiations and the atmosphere at the conclusion of one 
bargaining session will have an impact on the atmosphere in the next session. Each negotiator 
will then be concerned about his reputation. Thus, repetitive bargaining will often be more 
cooperative than single-shot bargaining. 
 
Pruitt and Carnevale (1993) examined the nature of cognitive processes in negotiation and 
their impact on negotiation behavior and outcome. The focus in this cognitive tradition is on 
individual cognition in the negotiation setting, on information processes and on the 
application of cognitive theory and method to negotiate. Cognitive effects are related to 
schemas, organized knowledge structures that guide and potentially distort the acquisition, 
storage, recall and use of information. The findings show that a loss frame of negotiator 
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outcomes had a negative impact on the likelihood of agreement when negotiators had an 
individualistic motive, but a positive impact on the quality of offers when there was a positive 
concern for the other party’s welfare. Overconfidence in one’s negotiation position also 
appears to be specific to the individualistic motive. Since learning and feedback play an 
important role in negotiation, it could be observed that as negotiators gained experience, they 
learned to set their first offers higher and offered fewer concessions in their role as buyers. 
 
The next section considers some scenarios of bargaining between different cultural types in 
the game theoretic sense.  
 
A Framework for International Business Negotiations 
 
The game can be described as a two-player bargaining model or a multistage game with 
incomplete information.   
 
The set of players N = {Ex, Im} consists of two elements, that is the exporter and the 
importer. The cultural background of players can be modeled as types or actions indicating 
the mental program. Both players can be assumed as either a linear-active, multi-active or 
reactive type T = {tL, tM, tR}. The importer has to judge whether the exporter’s type is one of 
the above- mentioned or just a mixture of the types with different weightings. The probability 
of being one pure or a mixture of the three types can be reflected in the probability 
distribution.    
 
Nature determines which type the players are. Player I can be a linear-active, multi-active or 
reactive type with a certain probability. Considering this scenario the next step will be to 
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think about player II’s type. Without loss of generality, player I is the exporter and player II  
is the importer in the game of intercultural bargaining. For this reason, there exists a special 
order of the players in this model, see the ordered pairs of players in table 3. 
 
************ 
Insert TABLE 3: Buyer-Seller Model for Different Cultures in International Negotiations 
************* 
 
Since it makes a difference whether one is in a buyer or seller position, culturally determined 
behavior might lead to different outcomes when being either an exporter or importer. In the 
table above, the classification of linear-active, multi-active and reactive types is related to 
Graham’s (1985) study on US-American, Brazilian and Japanese business negotiation 
behavior, which explores their bargaining strategies. 
 
Thus, in this analytical framework, cultural differences in bargaining behavior are connected 
to the range of the initial offer, the frequency of rejection and the valuation of time. Different 
bargaining strategies occur because of setting a reasonable high price in order to obtain the 
desired price due to the duration of the negotiation period and to the resulting discounted 
value. For instance, a straightforward approach and the anticipation of a short bargaining 
period may result in a lower initial offer 0p  and lower costs of bargaining dependent on time. 
These rules include the range of price, as the final export price pEx, and the measure of time, 
as the discount factor , which will be introduced in combination into this model. As far as 
both players have incomplete information about the counterpart’s cultural bargaining 
behavior, uncertainties concerning the offered price, discounting and acceptance/rejection 
behavior matter. 
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Furthermore, the bargaining mechanism is either dependent on the exporter making offers, 
the importer making offers or on an alternation of offers. For this reason, the moves made by 
the players have to be considered, too. The following sections deal with the order of play, the 
time horizon, the sources of co-operation and conflict in relation to the types of players. 
 
General assumption: We have three categories of culture. The linear-active cultures set the 
initial offer they want to receive and have a short-term perspective, multi-active cultures tend 
to offer a high price considering a longer bargaining time horizon and reactive cultures are 
inclined to respond to the counterparts’ behavior.  
 
The bargaining power determines who sets the price. The exporter might offer 0p  knowing 
the value of the product v. Whereas, the importer’s private value of obtaining the product 
must be higher than the price he offers or accepts, which leads to v - p. Besides the different 
valuation of the product of a buyer-seller situation, the international business scenario 
demands the consideration of various strategic perceptions about the bargaining process. The 
time horizon plays an important role and in connection with the set of actions determines the 
bargaining problem under incomplete information due to the different time preferences of the 
players.  Since the diverse cases of interaction are developed in a last section of the paper, the 
following order of the play shows the timing of the model on an abstract level.  
 
FIGURE 1 
Timing of an Intercultural Bargaining Model 
 
Stage 1 Stage 2 Stage 3 Stage 4 Stage5…..  
 
 
 
Exporter  Importer   Exporter         Importer     Game may continue over more periods 
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offers accepts or offers again     accepts/   
price rejects or importer     rejects, 
  makes Exporter 
  counteroffer accepts/rejects 
      
      
TIME PERIOD I               TIME PERIOD II…… 
 
 
General order of the play: 
(1) Exporter offers price 
(2) Importer accepts or rejects offer 
(3) Acceptance leads to the end of the game. Rejection results in either another offer of the 
first player or a counterproposal of the second player. Depending on the types, there will be a 
sequence of offers and counteroffers or the break-up of the negotiations.  
 
Payoffs: We denote UEx and UIm for the exporter’s and the importer’s payoffs. The payoffs 
are dependent on the price, the costs and the discount factor involved in the bargaining 
process. The price pEx is for all types, the remaining price, which is left after bargaining over 
a special time period. The initial offer for each type 0p  consists of pEx plus the margin the 
players anticipate to be put on top dependent on their type zpp Ex 0 . The costs of 
bargaining are a product of the length of bargaining shown as discount factor  , which is 
different for the three types such as 10  RML  . We have L  for the impatient 
linear-active type, R  for the patient reactive type and M  for the multi-active type. The 
initial price offer is dependent on the types },,{0 RML pppp   and can be explained in the 
following:  
1. The linear-active exporter wants pEx, he offers pL his initial price which includes a small 
margin L to cover a short period of bargaining: pL = pEX + L or   
2. the multi-active exporter offers pM = pEX + M, in which M is a fixed margin considered to 
be on top of the price anticipating bargaining costs over the period of time,  
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3. the reactive exporter makes his initial offer with pR = pEX + R, considering R as a margin 
on top of the exporter’s price to consider the costs of delay o
r 
 
 
The payoffs are composed of the price pEX minus the costs involved. Since we expect the 
price to be the result of a bargaining procedure, the final price may be either according to the 
type of the precise expected final price, or, in case of difficulties during the procedure, the 
price pEX with a margin based on the time horizon. The latter occurs because of asymmetries 
in the bargaining behavior. With respect to the disagreement point after several periods of 
bargaining, this outcome includes negative payoffs due to the high bargaining costs. The 
interval between the offers  plays another important role to distinguish between the three 
types. Thus, we have 0L for a short bargaining linear-active type, 1R  for a patient 
reactive-type and }1,0{M for multi-active type. Since the empirical findings showed that 
the time interval between offers is dependent on the type of player, we can add to the price 
function the time interval   dependent on the type of player. This leads to the following 
functions )( LLp   for the linear-active player, )( MMp   for the multi-active and )( RRp   
for the reactive player. Additionally, we can consider the costs of bargaining dependent on 
time and type as )( LLc   for the linear-active, )( MMc   for the multi-active and )( RRc  for 
the reactive player. Similar to these functions, the value of the bargaining process for the 
importer might be dependent on the duration of the bargaining process. Thus, the value 
functions for the bargaining process might be )( LLv  , )( MMv  and )( RRv  , respectively. 
 
The pay-off functions are therefore different for the exporter and importer regarding their 
types. Let there be the following payoffs for the various types: the payoffs of the three types 
of exporters are )()( LLLL
Ex
L cpU  , )()( MMMM
Ex
M cpU   and 
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)( RRR
Ex
L cpU  likewise the importer’s payoffs are )()(
Im
LLLLL pvU   , 
)()(Im MMMMM pvU    and )()(
Im
RRRRR pvU   .  
 
Cross-border transactions have to take uncertainty about the business environment and 
cultural background into account. Since both business partners have private information 
about their preferences, strategies and time horizon, the bargaining game is a decision-
making scenario under uncertainty.  
 
Based on the general framework, the analysis of the nine scenarios of table 2 provides general 
insights into the order of the play and the time structure of these bargaining games. The 
scenarios are put together into four sections with respect to the games being played from the 
exporter’s perspective, such as bargaining with importers of similar cultural and culturally 
distant background. These four sections are structured such that a table of examples of 
exporter-importer combinations shows the potential co-operation and conflict.   
 
Rules of the Games of Activity-based Cross-Cultural Bargaining  
 
The following tables comprise the time structure, order of the play, payoffs and co-
operation/conflict of the exporter-importer scenarios based on their cultural characteristics. It 
is an application of the above-mentioned framework and can be seen as a starting point for 
hypothesis building, experimental research and game-theoretic analytical solutions. These 
nine negotiation scenarios were played in classroom experiments conducted by the author 
which are described at the end of this section and they build the basis of three bargaining 
papers with a linear-active, multi-active and reactive focus according to the tables. 
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*************  
TABLE 4: Exporter and Importer have a Similar Cultural Background 
 
************* 
 
Besides the negotiation scenarios of similar cultural types, the interesting cases of ‘culturally 
distant’ partners are developed in the following sections. The potential negotiation scenarios 
are summarized in the three tables below and can be seen as the starting point for building 
hypotheses for empirical research. 
 
******************* 
TABLE 5: Linear-active Exporter bargains either with a Multi-active or a Reactive Importer 
 
******************* 
 
******************* 
TABLE 6: Multi-active Exporter negotiates either with a Linear-active or a Reactive Importer 
 
****************** 
 
******************* 
TABLE 7: Reactive exporter negotiates with a Linear-active or a Multi-active Importer 
******************* 
 
The scenarios have the focus on the structure of a negotiation process between exporters and 
importers. As far as the framework deals with the combination of game theoretical strategies 
with cultural mental programming of bargaining, many other factors occurring in an 
importation-exportation scenario could not yet be considered. Nevertheless, this framework 
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should lead to a strategic understanding of the negotiation process between different cultures 
to avoid mishaps and to develop insights into the different approaches used in an international 
setting. Ideas for future research are that the bargaining structure itself gets determined 
endogenously – in contrast to general game-theoretic assumption of exogenously given 
bargaining structure. For instance, an alternating offers game is more likely for some 
scenarios than for others. Furthermore, uncertainty can be one-sided or two-sided and a 
bargaining mechanism design can be developed with respect to these different uncertainties.  
 
Co-operation and Conflict 
The part ‘co-operation and conflict’ in the above-mentioned table can be seen as a verbal 
approach towards the possible equilibrium concepts. Co-operation stands for an equilibrium 
and conflict points to break-up, stalemate and disagreement points. In cross-cultural 
bargaining scenarios, the mishaps due to different cultural profiles are important to anticipate. 
Mathematical solution concepts are considered in the follow-up papers to this current 
introductory paper. The equilibrium concepts reach from complete information to incomplete 
information outcomes, from pooling to separating equilibria and from splitting the pie 
solutions to indirect bargaining mechanisms. The complex games of incomplete information 
are not considered in this paper. It would be important to introduce a dummy player into the 
time horizon and a randomization of the types will be possible. Thus, this is an ideal 
equilibrium concept for mixed cultural types and a suggestion for further research. 
 
Classroom Experiments 
 
Having used this framework over ten years in classroom experiments, it is important to state 
that the students of different cultural backgrounds have enjoyed the bargaining process. In all 
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these experiments the design was a simple bargaining scenario between a buyer and a seller 
from different cultural backgrounds. The students were undergraduates in International 
Business, postgraduates of International Management and MBA students of International 
Management. The description of the three types (linear-active, multi-active and reactive) was 
given to the students in advance so that they could position themselves as a cultural type. 
These hundreds of students were from the UK, USA, Italy, France, Germany, Austria, 
Central and Eastern Europe, Sweden, Finland, India, Pakistan, Nigeria, Japan, China and 
Brazil. The products were dependent on the countries involved, there was either buyer or 
seller power.  
 
Over ten years a pattern emerged that the cognitive programming was very strong in the 
bargaining process. People tend to adapt to new cultural environments but when it comes to 
bargaining, the procedure of offering, rejection of offers, acceptance of an offer, making 
counter-offers, the length of the bargaining horizon and the use of price as a signal is 
determined by cultural roots. The observations and documentation of the bargaining 
procedures showed consistency with the above-mentioned negotiation scenarios.  
 
The author wants to point out that it is important to use this framework in a cross-cultural 
experimental context. Since MBA students who had real-life negotiations with various 
cultures involved found that this bargaining framework was useful for them to anticipate the 
moves of their counterparts and it benefited a co-operative solution, it is necessary to focus 
on the empirical/experimental side in the next stage of the theory development. 
 
Conclusion  
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This dynamic intercultural bargaining framework shows the transformation of culturally 
programmed bargaining behavior into game-theoretical properties.  
 
Scenarios of international business negotiations were developed to clarify the bargaining 
rules of the culture clusters such as linear-active, multi-active and/or reactive types of players 
when bargaining either in a similar or a different cultural environment. On the basis of the 
‘time is money’-approach of linear-active cultures, the ‘combining tasks’-approach of multi-
active cultures and the ‘building trust’-approach of reactive cultures, the combination of the 
different types could be developed and refined.   
 
In detail, the logic of argumentation, the order of the play, the time horizon and the frequency 
of rejection were related to the specific activity types of culture. Furthermore, bargaining and 
delay costs had to be considered in connection with the time structure of the players. The 
disagreement point reflected the conflict between the players, which is the stalemate or even 
the break-up of a negotiation procedure.  
 
Under the assumption that the differences in bargaining behavior are derived from the 
inherent time perspectives in cross-cultural negotiations, the games being played by the three 
types were related to co-operation and conflict. It could be proposed that further research 
should focus on the two player decision-making processes either in pure or mixed cases.  
Implications are either to develop formal models or to test connected hypotheses in empirical 
studies or experiments. This would lead to accurate outcomes of where and when stalemates, 
deadlocks, break-ups and agreements occur. Another option to tackle culture in bargaining 
models could be by evolutionary models of game theory. With respect to new approaches of 
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rationality in game theory, intercultural bargaining models could deal with bounded 
rationality assumptions in addition to the general assumption.  
 
Though this paper can be considered as an introduction to the linear-active, multi-active and 
reactive ways of bargaining, the scenarios of the seller-buyer combinations based on their 
cultural activity types show why some international negotiations might lead to a break-up and 
stalemate based on cultural mishaps of bargaining. This approach should help to anticipate 
and avoid conflicts and disagreements which are based on a different cultural mental 
program. Conceptualizing strategic reasoning can provide theoretical support for decision-
making processes and the revelation of different time perceptions and preferences inherent in 
various cultures. Relating cost and pricing aspects to the timing of the model helps to 
anticipate future problems and opportunities in cross-cultural negotiations.  
 
Overall, this paper shows that culturally-programmed bargaining behavior in seller-buyer 
negotiations on an international stage explains why some pairings are easier reaching 
agreements than others. Cultural activity types such as linear-actives (time is money), multi-
actives (haggling is an art of negotiations) and reactives (building trust) categories play an 
important role when determining outcomes of international negotiations. International 
negotiations whether political or business will need to draw on the knowledge of cultural 
activity types as cultural cognitive bargaining patterns which show how to think forwards and 
to reason backwards in order to anticipate co-operation and conflict on an international stage. 
The success of understanding culturally embedded bargaining behavior should benefit 
international business and political negotiations. 
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TABLES: 
 
TABLE 1 
Characteristics of the Linear-active, Multi-active and Reactive Cultures 
 
LINEAR-
ACTIVE 
MULTI-ACTIVE REACTIVE FOCUS 
• works in strict 
time limit 
• is dominated by 
time schedule 
 
 
• divides projects 
 
• sticks to the plan 
 
• believes in facts 
 
 
 
• obtains 
information 
from a statistics, 
handbooks and 
databases  
 
• pursues correct 
procedure 
 
• finishes actions 
 
 
• confronts with 
logic 
• interrupts rarely 
• works at any 
time 
• time schedule is 
not predictable 
 
 
• projects 
influence other 
projects 
• changes plans 
 
• changes facts 
 
 
• obtains 
information first 
hand (orally) 
 
 
 
• considers 
relationships as 
important 
• finishes human 
transactions 
 
• confronts  
emotional 
• interrupts often 
• works flexible 
time 
• reacts to time 
schedule 
 
 
• regards the 
whole picture 
• makes small 
changes 
• statements are 
promises 
 
 
 
• Uses both  
 
 
 
 
 
• reacts in a quiet 
way 
• reacts on 
partner 
 
 
• avoids 
confrontation 
• Does not 
interrupt 
 
 
Importance 
ofTime 
 
 
 
Strategic 
configuration 
(Process 
orientation) 
 
 
 
 
Information 
 
 
 
 
 
Action profile 
(Activity) 
 
 
 
 
Negotiation 
style 
Culture Examples   
US (WASPs), 
British, 
Australians, 
Germanics,Swedish 
Mediterranean, 
Eastern European, 
Latin 
American;Arab 
African, Indian, 
Pakistan,   
Japanese, Chinese, 
Taiwanese, 
Singaporean, 
Korean; Finnish 
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TABLE 2 
Empirical Characteristics of Activity-Based Cultural Types 
 
 Linear-active Multi-active Reactive 
Time 
preferences 
(discount 
factor) 
 
Short Long Long 
Time interval 
between offers 
 
Short Relatively short, many 
offers 
Long 
Height of 
offers (initial 
price) for 
buyers 
Low High High 
Frequency of  
Rejection 
(Number and 
Meaning  of 
‘Nos’) 
Low  
(no means rejection 
of offer) 
High  
(‘no’ implies art of 
bargaining and 
continuation of 
offer/counter-offer) 
Low  
(no means losing face 
or insult; rejection only 
after a long period of 
bargaining or after 
signing contract 
Leader-
follower 
Leader Leader Follower 
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TABLE 3 
Buyer-Seller Model for Different Cultures in International Negotiations 
 
  Importer 
 
Exporter  
Importer (Player II - Buyer) 
 
Linear-activeCulture       Multi-activeCulture          Re-activeCulture 
      
 
Linear-active  
culture 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Exporter  
(Player I - 
Seller)    
      Multi-active  
culture 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
            Reactive  
Culture 
Similar cultural 
background with  
refinements  
Scenario1 
Example: 
American exporter – 
German importer 
‘Time is Money’ – 
Approach 
);( LLLL pvcp 
 
Exporter linear-
active and importer  
multi-active 
Scenario 4 
Example:  
American exporter 
– Brazilian 
importer 
);( MMLL pvcp   
Exporter linear-active 
and 
Importer reactive 
Scenario 5 
Example:  
American exporter – 
Japanese importer 
 
);( RRLL pvcp   
Exporter multi-active 
and importer linear- 
active 
Scenario 6 
Example:  
Brazilian exporter – 
American importer 
 
);( LLMM pvcp   
 
Similar cultural 
background with 
refinements  
Scenario 2 
Example: Brazilian 
exporter – Italian 
importer 
‘Haggling’-
Approach 
);( MMMM pvcp 
 
Exporter multi-active 
and importer reactive 
Scenario 7 
Example:  
Brazilian exporter – 
Japanese importer 
 
 
 
);( RRMM pvcp   
Exporter reactive and 
importer  
Linear-active 
Scenario 8 
Example: Japanese 
exporter – American 
importer 
 
);( LLRR pvcp   
Exporter reactive 
And importer  
Multi-active 
Scenario 9 
Example: Japanese 
exporter – Brazilian 
importer 
 
);( MMRR pvcp   
Similar cultural 
background with 
refinement 
Scenario 3 
Example: Japanese 
exporter – Finnish 
importer 
‘Building trust’-
Approach 
);( RRRR pvcp   
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TABLE 4 
Exporter and Importer have a Similar Cultural Background 
 
 Linear-active Exporter and 
Importer 
American -German 
Scenario 1 
Multi-active Exporter and 
Importer 
Brazilian - Italian 
Scenario 2 
Reactive Exporter and 
Importer 
Japanese - Finnish 
Scenario 3 
Time 
structure 
Both players - a short term 
perspective 
Both players – long time horizon.  Both players - very long time 
horizon  
Order of 
the Play 
(1) The linear-active exporter 
might offer a price pL to the 
linear-active importer. (2) The 
linear-active importer might 
either reject or accept it. (3) 
The acceptance of the offer 
might terminate the 
negotiation. The rejection of 
the offer might lead to another 
offer by the exporter, a 
counter-offer or the end of the 
negotiation 
(1) The multi-active exporter 
might offer price pM.  (2) The 
multi-active importer would either 
reject or accept. The probability 
of acceptance is lower than in the 
case of linear-active/linear-active 
combinations, since the 
perception of the players is based 
on a long time horizon. (3) 
Rejecting the offer will lead to 
another offer or a counter-
proposal of the importer.  
(1) The reactive exporter 
might make the initial offer 
pR. (2) The reactive importer 
might accept or reject it. (3) 
As far as both players are 
reactive cultures, there might 
be a deadlock point right after 
the beginning of the 
bargaining. The bargaining 
horizon is very long in both 
cases.  
 
Payoffs The exporter’s payoff is 
)()( LLLL
Ex
L cpU  and 
the importer’s payoff is 
)()(Im LLLLL pvU   . 
The exporter’s payoff is 
)()( MMMM
Ex
M cpU  and 
the importer’s payoff is 
)()(Im MMMMM pvU   . 
The exporter’s payoff is 
)()( RRRR
Ex
R cpU  and 
the importer’s payoff is 
)()(Im RRRRR pvU   . 
Co-
operation 
and 
Conflict 
Co-operation might occur 
because of a mutual 
understanding of signals and 
the similar time horizon 
Conflict might only arise on 
the basis of the rejection of the 
offered price and 
inappropriate counter-offers.  
 
Co-operation should occur in the 
duration of time and in the similar 
bargaining behavior. 
Conflict might arise in the case of 
different perceptions about the 
offer and combination of tasks. 
Co-operation should be found 
in the mutual understanding of 
the bargaining process and the 
same standards concerning 
trust.  
Conflict might occur in the 
development of the leader and 
follower position. 
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TABLE 5 
Linear-active Exporter bargains either with a Multi-active or a Reactive Importer 
 
 Linear-active Exporter bargains with 
multi-active Importer 
American Exp – Brazilian Imp. 
Scenario 4 
Linear-active Exporter bargains with 
reactive Importer 
American Exp- Japanese Imp 
Scenario 5 
Time structure Exporter – short-term perspective 
Importer – long-term perspective 
Clash: Different negotiation styles 
(logic versus emotional approach) and 
range of offers as well as discount 
factors 
Exporter – short-term perspective 
Importer – very long-term perspective 
Reactive importers tend to have the target 
of developing long-term relationships, 
whereas a linear-active exporter is only 
interested in settling the contract. 
Order of the 
Play 
(1) The linear-active exporter might 
make an initial offer pL, (2) The multi-
active importer might reject or accept 
it.  (3) The probability of rejection is 
very high, since this is the starting 
point of negotiations for the multi-
active player. The linear-active might 
consider rejection as the end of the 
game.   
 
(1) The linear-active exporter might start 
to make an offer pL. (2) The reactive 
importer should reject or accept it. (3) 
The rejection of the offer might result in 
another offer or a counter-offer. If the 
reactive importer is interested in 
responding to the behavior of his 
counterpart, the importer might continue 
to bargain over a short period of time 
connected to the exporter’s situation, yet 
the trust-building approach would favor a 
long bargaining horizon with less 
rejections. 
Payoffs The exporter’s payoff is 
)()( LLLL
Ex
L cpU  and the 
importer’s payoff is 
)()(Im MMMMM pvU   . 
The exporter’s payoff is 
)()( LLLL
Ex
L cpU  and the 
importer’s payoff is 
)()(Im RRRRR pvU   . 
Cooperation 
and Conflict 
Co-operation: Co-operation might only 
occur in a situation where the linear-
active type intends to set a high margin 
and to bargain over it during a longer 
time period. 
Conflict: The basic bargaining 
behavior of these two types will lead to 
conflict. Besides the different time 
horizon, the incompatibility of the two 
negotiation styles should trigger a 
conflict. 
 
Co-operation: Although difficulties 
concerning the time schedule might arise, 
the reactive type ought to be interested in 
a positive outcome and not losing face.  
Conflict: Because of the different 
approach in the time horizon and in the 
objectives of the negotiation, there might 
be a deadlock situation straight at the 
beginning. Even acceptance over a long 
time period could lead to a conflict since 
the reactive type might still reject an offer 
in a late stage of bargaining (or even after 
signing the agreement).  
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TABLE 6 
Multi-active Exporter negotiates either with a Linear-active or a Reactive Importer 
 
 Multi-active Exporter bargains with 
linear-active Importer 
Brazilian Exp – American Imp. 
Scenario 6 
Multi-active Exporter bargains with 
reactive Importer 
Brazilian Exp. – Japanese Imp. 
Scenario 7 
Time structure Exporter – long-term perspective 
Importer – short-term perspective 
 
Exporter – long-term perspective 
Importer – very long-term perspective 
Order of the 
Play 
(1) The multi-active exporter might make 
an initial offer pM. (2) The linear-active 
importer might accept or reject it. (3) 
The rejection of the offer should lead to 
another offer by the exporter or the 
counter proposal of the importer. The 
exporter targets further bargaining 
periods, whereas the linear-active 
importer’s approach towards bargaining 
is different. Rejection of an offer reflects 
a strategic move from the exporter’s 
perspective, although the importer would 
want to show that this price is not 
acceptable and might terminate the 
negotiation.  
(1) The multi-active exporter might 
make an initial offer pM. (2) The 
reactive importer might reject or accept 
it.  (3) The rejection of the proposal will 
lead in the second stage to either 
another offer or a counter-offer. 
Assuming that the multi-active exporter 
connects various projects and the 
reactive importer responds to the given 
behavior, a long bargaining process 
might be the result. The negotiation 
procedure might show a sequence of 
rejections, offers and counteroffers with 
the aim to develop a long lasting 
business relationship on both sides.    
 
Payoffs The exporter’s payoff is 
)()( MMMM
Ex
M cpU  and the 
importer’s payoff is 
)()(Im LLLLL pvU   . 
 
The exporter’s payoff is 
)()( MMMM
Ex
M cpU  and the 
importer’s payoff is 
)()(Im RRRRR pvU   . 
 
Cooperation 
and Conflict 
Co-operation could occur in the first two 
periods when the good and its price meet 
the needs of the importer, and the 
exporter will be satisfied with the price 
and additional services being negotiated. 
Conflict might arise within the first 
periods when the exporter expects the 
importer to make another offer, or in the 
case that no other deals can be made out 
of the underlying business. 
Co-operation can be found over the 
time period. Both will know each other 
better during the bargaining process, 
which is an important target of the 
reactive type.  
Conflict might occur when the different 
planning horizons, the methods of 
confrontation and ways of dealing with 
the agenda might not be compatible. 
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TABLE 7 
Reactive exporter negotiates with a Linear-active or a Multi-active Importer 
 Reactive Exporter bargains with Linear-
active Importer 
Japanese exporter –American importer 
Scenario 8 
Reactive Exporter bargains with 
multi-active Importer 
Japanese exporter – Brazilian 
importer 
Scenario 9 
Time structure Exporter – very long-term perspective 
Importer – short-term perspective 
Exporter – very-long term perspective 
Importer – long-term perspective 
Different goals are the source for 
long-term perspectives (reacting to 
counterpart and trust-building on one 
hand and emotional negotiation style 
on the other hand) 
Order of the Play (1) The reactive exporter might make an 
offer pR and (2) might expect the linear-
active importer either to (accept or) 
reject it. Since the linear-active importer 
is interested in a short negotiation 
process, (3) there is a high probability 
that the next stage of the game might 
conclude the bargaining. Both, either 
acceptance or rejection in the first period 
will lead to the termination of the game.  
(1) The reactive exporter might make 
an offer pR, (2) the multi-active 
importer might accept or reject it. (3) 
The rejection of the offer should lead 
to the termination, to another offer or 
to a counter-offer. Both parties are 
interested in a long negotiation 
process, although their objectives are 
different.  
 
Payoffs The exporter’s payoff is 
)()( RRRR
Ex
R
cpU  and the 
importer’s payoff is 
)()(Im LLLLL pvU   . 
The exporter’s payoff is 
)()( RRRR
Ex
R cpU  and the 
importer’s payoff is 
)()(Im MMMMM pvU   . 
Cooperation and 
Conflict 
Co-operation should occur in the case of 
a reactive exporter accepting an offer 
made by a linear-active importer in the 
first two stages of a negotiation process. 
Conflict might arise in a setting being 
characterized by an importer waiting for 
an offer of a reactive exporter who might 
be looking for the counterpart’s 
trustworthiness and other qualitative 
factors. Since the time horizon of the 
reactive exporter is longer than the one 
of the importer, conflict might occur in 
the first negotiation periods.  
Co-operation: Although this 
combination seems to be very difficult 
to manage, co-operation ought to 
occur in terms of longer bargaining 
and the connection of private with 
professional life.   
Conflict might arise because of the 
different bargaining behavior and the 
time horizon varying in the 
circumstance of a reactive exporter 
negotiating with a multi-active 
importer. Some deadlock points will 
probably occur as well. 
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FIGURES: 
 
FIGURE 1: Cultural Profiles of Linear-active, Multi-active and Reactive Cultures 
Multi-Active (Brazil) 
 France Arab Countries 
 Belgium India 
 
Linea-Active (German, US) Canada Reactive (Japan, Vietnam) 
 
 
Figure 2: Timing of an Intercultural Bargaining Model 
 
Stage 1 Stage 2 Stage 3 Stage 4 Stage5…..  
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